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THE LEGAL ORDERING OF SATELLITE
TELECOMMUNICATION: PROBLEMS AND ALTERNATIVES
DELBERT D. SMITHt
The use of satellites in outer space to provide a means of transmission
for international telecommunication could be viewed as simply a tech-
nological advancement neither necessitating basic structural changes in
the international control institutions nor requiring alteration of the
control theories designed to regulate unauthorized transmissions. How-
ever, the magnitude of the changes involved, coupled with increased
governmental concern, has resulted in a number of politico-legal problems.
It is the purpose of this article to examine on several levels of
analysis the implications of utilizing satellites as a means of telecom-
munication transmission. Introductory material on the development of
communications satellite technology stresses the need for international
organization and co-operation to oversee the launching and maintenance
of a global communications system and indicates the pressures for the
implementation of control measures over transmissions originating in
outer space. The organizational structure developed with regard to
commercial satellite activities is then examined with emphasis on the
Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Communica-
tions Satellite System (INTELSAT) and on the problem areas to be
considered in developing definitive arrangements for the ordering of a
global system.
Taking the State as the fundamental unit of organization it is
possible to trace the series of relationships that make up international
satellite telecommunication control. The State is the basic unit of the
INTELSAT consortium, acting partially through its domestic telecom-
munication entity, which in many states is an official governmental
organ. The INTELSAT consortium is responsible for the launching and
tLegal Advisor, Space Science and Engineering Center, University of Wisconsin.
Research for this article was conducted at Cambridge University, England, the Interna-
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maintenance of telecommunication satellites and the operation of tele-
communication channels between the space segment of the system and
the earth stations which remain under direct State control. Superimposed
on this structure are the regulatory processes of the International Tele-
communication Union concerning the technical and administrative order-
ing of outer space telecommunication through the development of an
expanded general competence in dealing with outer space matters, the
revision of sections of regulatory provisions pertaining to telecom-
munication in outer space, and the resolution of specific problems in
space telecommunication such as the regulation of military communica-
tions satellites. Finally, consideration will be given to the application of
control theories to unauthorized telecommunication originating from
artificial satellites.
THE TECHNOLOGY
There are two basic types of communication satellites. The first is
the passive satellite which simply reflects a signal transmitted from one
earth station to another earth station. Its construction is relatively simple
and it is highly reliable since it contains no electronic circuitry. However,
this more primitive type requires the use of extremely powerful trans-
mitters and complex, sensitive receivers, both of which are exceedingly
expensive. Also, the use of complicated ground apparatus means that the
cost of the system increases greatly as ground stations are built in States
participating in the communications system.
The second type of communications satellite is the active commun-
ications satellite which amplifies the signal it receives before transmitting
it to another ground station. The higher cost of the satellite itself is
balanced by the relatively low cost for the transmitting and receiving
apparatus. This type of satellite, with the addition of a recording device,
can be used for both real time and delayed transmissions.
The development of satellite telecommunication has now progressed
from experimentation with passive and active satellites to the development
of sophisticated synchronous* satellites. Echo I (a passive reflector) was
launched on August 12, 1960, by the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration,1 and the final phase of the experimentation with passive
*A satellite in synchronous orbit revolves in a circular orbit around the earth in
the plane of the equator. Its period of revolution is the same as the earth's period of
rotation. The virtue of a synchronous satellite is that it remains in a fixed position
with respect to a point on the earth and can, therefore, by itself provide uninterrupted
service from a particular ground station to a large area of the earth. If properly placed,
as few as three satellites could provide telecommunication coverage for the entire world.
1. Echo I was a metalized balloon (100 feet in diameter) with an aluminum-
coated surface which reflected radio waves with frequencies of up to 10,000 megacycles.
It was placed in a 1,000 mile-high orbit.
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satellites was achieved with the launching of the Echo II satellite on Janu-
ary 25, 1964.2 Experimentation with active satellites began as early as
1958 with the launching by the U.S. Army Signal Corps of Project Score,
a relay satellite controlled by ground station commands. While the active
life of this satellite was only thirty days, it did demonstrate the feasibility
of relaying voice, code, and teletype messages.3 In October of 1960, the
Signal Corps launched a more advanced satellite, Courier, into a 500-600
mile-high orbit. Through its components, consisting of four receivers,
four transmitters, and five tape recorders, this satellite was able (during
its eighteen days in orbit) to receive signals, store them, and re-transmit
them on command from the various earth stations.
Project Telstar4 consisted of two active satellite launchings, the
first of which was accomplished on July 10, 1962 and the second on
May 7, 1963. Of interest was the exchange of television programs
provided by these satellites in black and white and color, and the pro-
liferation of ground stations participating in the project.5 Similarly, the
NASA experimental satellites Relay I and II, launched on December
13, 1962 and January 21, 1964, were used for communications experi-
ments between the United States and Europe, South America, and
Japan.6 The use of these satellites to provide transoceanic coverage of
news broadcasts, the 1964 Olympics, and other major world events
demonstrated the possibilities that international broadcasting holds for
the world. The three satellites of NASA's Project Syncom provided the
first test of repeater satellites in a synchronous orbit. Syncom I was
launched in February, 1963, Syncom II in July, 1963, and Syncom III
in August of 1964. The achievement of a synchronous orbit of Syncom
2. Echo II was 135 feet in diameter, had an aluminum surface, and contained a
controlled inflation system. This project resulted in the development and demonstration
of a rigid sphere which could be used for passive reflection and stimulated international
cooperation in communication experiments.
3. In December of 1958, this satellite transmitted a pre-recorded Christmas
message by President Eisenhower.
4. The Telstar satellites were developed by the American Telephone and Telegraph
Co. in cooperation with N.A.S.A.
5. In addition to ground stations in Maine, England, and France, other stations
were established (by 1964) in Italy, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Spain.
6. Relay I contained more than 8,000 solar cells to charge the batteries which
provided the power for the satellite. While only designed to function for one year, it
continued to operate for an additional year. Relay II was an improved version of the
earlier satellite launched into a higher orbit and also used for extensive communication
experimentation.
7. Syncom I was unsuccessful, but Syncom II achieved its synchronous orbit, aided
by an "apogee kick rocket" aboard the satellite which was fired to change the tra-
jectory and place it in the desired orbit, thus making lit the first operational com-
munications satellite in synchronous orbit. However, the orbit did not actually coincide
with the equatorial plane, and this defect had to be remedied by Syncom III which
utilized a more powerful launching rocket (the Thrust Augmented Delta-T.A.D.) which
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II and Syncom III concluded the first stage of the NASA experimental
communications satellite program. The transmission of the Olympics
from Japan provided the first use of two satellites in television broadcast-
ing. Syncom III was used to transmit the signal from Japan to the
United States over the Pacific Ocean, and then Relay I transmitted the
signal over the Atlantic Ocean to Europe. While these were not "live"
broadcasts, they indicated the feasibility of a global network and also
demonstrated the fact that the problems which might hinder the utiliza-
tion of this transmission means would be other than technical ones.'
NASA development of its Applications Technology Satellite
(ATS) Project will result in improved launch vehicle capability and the
development of a communications satellite that, instead of spinning, will
always keep one face pointed toward the earth and thus allow for direc-
tive antennas to be used with less energy waste and a stronger signal.
NASA also envisions the development of a direct broadcasting satellite
with a tentative launching date in 1971 that would be capable of trans-
mitting voice broadcasts to home receivers covering nearly an entire
hemisphere, and by 1975, with the development of nuclear reactors to
increase power capability, there will be testing of a broadcast satellite
for direct television transmission.
COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIPS: COMSAT AND INTELSAT
To facilitate the emergence of a commercial global telecommunica-
tion system, attempts have been made to establish the organizational
structure necessary to achieve the requisite co-operation. In addition to
the obvious saving in hardware cost, a single global system would also
alleviate the technical problems that would arise if a number of States
attempted to locate commercial communication satellites in close proxi-
mity causing frequency usage problems as well as increasing the possibility
of collision. Standardization would be another benefit to be derived from
a co-operative venture, either through the use of a single system or
through the development of compatible systems which could be inter-
connected without the necessity of routing the transmission through a
ground station.
successfully propelled the satellite into orbit with a perigee of 702 miles above the
earth. The apogee kick rocket was again used, and the satellite was posiflioned in its
desired location-the intersection of the equator and the international date line, east of
the Gilbert Islands in the Pacific Ocean-on Sept. 11, 1964.
8. While global broadcasting is the use most relevant to ths study, other uses
may be equally as significant. There are numerous possibilities for the transmission of
medical data, oceanographic data, weather data, navigational information, and com-
puterized data processing information.
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The Communications Satellite Act,9 the initial domestic legislation
toward establishing a commercial communications satellite system, was
enacted in the United States in 1962. The purpose of the Act was
to establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with other
countries, as expeditiously as practicable, a commercial com-
munications satellite system, as part of an improved global
communications network, which will be responsive to public
needs and national objectives, which will serve the communica-
tion needs of the United States and other countries, and which
wil contribute to world peace and understanding.10
Through the creation of the Communications Satellite Corporation (Com-
sat),"I a private entity (with, however, strict governmental supervision),
which was empowered to "plan, initiate, construct, own, manage, and
operate itself or in conjunction with foreign governments or business
entities a commercial communications satellite system,"' 2 it was hoped
9. Communications Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Comm. Sat. Act]. For the legislative history of the Act, see S. REP. Nos. 1584 & 1873
hnd ILR. REP. No. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). See also Statement of the
President on Communication Satellite Policy, Office of the White House Press Secretary,
July 24, 1961, which contained President Kennedy's formulation of American national
policy on satellite communication. Further analysis can be found in: A. HALEY, SPACE
LAW AND GoVERNMtENT 188-205 (1963); Moulton, Coinercial Space Communications
in SPACE AND SociETY 73 (H. Taubenfeld ed. 1964) ; Levin, Organizatiolt and Control of
Communicationrs Satellites, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 315 (1965); Moulton, Some Legal
Aspects of International Communications, 41 N.C.L. REv. 354 (1963); Moulton,
Communication Satellites-the Proposed Communication Satellite Act of 1962, 18
Bus. LAw. 173, 174-75 (1962); Segal, Comnumications Satellites-Progress and the
Road Ahead, 17 VAND. L. REv. 677, 683-87 (1964) ; Note, The Communications Satellite
Act of 1962, 76 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1962).
10. Comn. Sat Act., § 102(a). Section 102(b) continued by stating that develop-
ing countries should be aided, that the most economical use be made of the frequency
spectrum, and that the lowest possible rates be applied to the services. Section 102(c)
provided for nondiscriminatory access for all authorized users, the maintenance of
procurement competition and service offering competition, and compliance with federal
antitrust laws. Section 102(d) left open the possibility for a domestic satellite system,
or "the creation of additional communications satellite systems, if required to meet
unique governmental needs or if otherwise required in the national interests." See also
§ 201 (a) (6). Two problem areas developed as a result of section 102(d) ; one concerned
the development of a military communications satellite program, and the other con-
cerned the organizational arrangements to be made for a domestic communications
satellite program.
11. Comm. Sat. Act, § 301. Sections 302 through 304 provide for the process of
organization, the directors and officers, and the financing of the corporation.
12. Comm. Sat. Act, § 305(a) (1). It was also authorized to:
(2) furnish, for hire, channels of communication to United States communica-
tions common carriers and to other authorized entities, foreign and domestic; and
(23) own and operate satellite terminal stations when licensed by the Commission.
Section 305(b) contained a partial list of activities that the corporation could undertake
in furtherance of its objectives. For a discussion of the conflicts of interest within
Comsat and an evaluation of the Second Earth Station and Authorized User decisions,
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to further international collaboration in a global system. The policy de-
cision to make United States participation in a global system take the
form of a private corporation subject to appropriate governmental reg-
ulation created internal difficulties,"5 most of which were resolved in
due course in the interests of securing early agreement on an international
system.
A matter that has received little comment in terms of the develop-
ment of a global system has been the growth of a separate military
communication satellite capability. The U.S. Defense Communications
Agency, a Department of Defense management organization, through its
Communications Satellite Project Office, has embarked on the develop-
ment of a Defense Communications Satellite Program. This was begun
after discussions and studies made with Comsat concerning a joint
military-commercial system were terminated. The three phases of the
Department of Defense Communications Satellite Program 4 will cul-
minate in an Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project to
come into being in 1970."5 The existence of separate military com-
munication satellites will modify international technical agreements de-
signed to allocate frequency space and to order actual satellite orbit place-
ment, and might affect the frame of reference of proposed program
content control if the military decides to use any part of its system for
see Schwartz, Comsat, the Carriers, and the Earth Stations: Some Problems zth
"Melding Variegated Interests", 76 YALE L.J. 441 (1967).
13. Questions were raised as to the relative bargaining power of Comsat vis-a-vis
European governmental telecommunication agencies, and to the possibility of merging
the facilities of the American carriers to provide for the most efficient use of the
hardware and to offset high fixed costs. A suggestion has been made for the enactment
of permissive merger legislation to allow for any desirable restructuring which the F.C.C.
finds to be in the public interest. Report and Recommendations to the Senate and
House Commerce Committees, Submitted by the Intra-Governmental Committee on
International Telecommunications, April 29, 1966. The Wall Street Journal, May 31,
1966, at 28, col. 1. The American Broadcasting Company proposal to launch a satellite
over the United States to provide domestic service has been utilized by the Ford
Foundation in their plan to use a part of the savings from such a system to finance
educational television. This scheme would result in the commercial networks, and
possibly all others using the system, paying to underwrite the noncommercial service.
In the Matter of Establishment of Domestic Communications-satellite Facilities by Non-
governmental Entities, F.C.C. Docket No. 16495 (1966). See particularly Comments of
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Dec. 15, 1966, Part III at 8 for com-
ments on the Proposal of the Ford Foundation. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1966, at 41, col. 2.
14. Phase I involves use of the Syncom III satellite for experimentation, and
Phase II involves installation of an Initial Defense Communication Satellite System to
be used primarily for research and development. The space segment of this phase will
consist of twenty-three communications satellites randomly distributed in an equatorial
orbit slightly below synchronous orbit. They will have a power output of three watts
supplied by solar cells, and will provide a limited number of voice channels.
15. Presentation by Lieutenant General Alfred D. Starbird, U.S.A., Director, De-
fense Communications Agency, to the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Com-
mittee, Jan. 25, 1966, at 14.
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political socialization broadcasts to citizens of other States. Given the
ideological nature of limited warfare today, it is possible that direct
broadcasting from satellites could be used to great advantage as part of a
pacification or information program in a particular country.
Negotiations had begun as early as 196316 in an attempt to gain
international co-operation for the promulgation of interim arrangements
for a global commercial system, the result of which was the formulation
of two inter-related agreements establishing interim arrangements for a
global communications satellite system. The first document, the Agree-
ment Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Com-
munications Satellite System,"7 was intergovernmental in character and
provided the framework for the proposed organization. The second
agreement, called the "Special Agreement"18 dealt with the commercial,
financial, and technical operations of the system and was signed either by
governments or by the communication entities designated by them. The
Agreements pertained basically to the space segment of the communica-
tion satellite system, and the earth stations remained under the control
and ownership of the participating States.
The Preamble of the first Agreement recalled the principle set forth
in Resolution No. 1721 (XVI)1 of the United Nations General Assem-
bly that satellite communication should be available to the nations of the
world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis,
and further specified that
16. Following a conference in Strasbourg in 1961, nineteen European countries met
in Paris and London in 1963 to discuss European cooperation. A plan for a European
system drafted by Eurospace (a European non-profit industry association) was
rejected by the European Conference on Space Communication which met in 1964 in
Rome and London with United States representatives and culminated in a conference
in London between fourteen European countries, the United States, Australia, Canada,
and Japan. The European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the
European Space Research Organization (ESRO) also indicate the desire for European
solidarity in communication satellite matters.
17. [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. No. 5646 [hereinafter cited as Agreement]:
Both agreements are reprinted in 3 INT'L LEGAL MATEUIALs 806, 810 (1964) and 51
DEPT. STATE BuL.. 281-90 (1964). The signatories to the Agreements as of Sept. 30,
1967 included: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon,
Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein,
Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway,
Pakistan, Peru, Phillipines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Republic,
United Kingdom, United States, Vatican City, Venezuela, Yemen.
See generally Johnson, International Co-operation in Satellite Conimunication
Systems, 1967 PROc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L, 24, and Simsarian, Interim Arrangements for
a Global Communications Satellite System, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 344 (1965).
18. [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1745, T.I.A.S. No. 5646 [hereinafter cited as Special
Agreement].
19. G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 6-7, U.N. Doe. A/5100
(1961).
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... satellite communications should be organized in such a way
as to permit all States to have access to the global system and
those States so wishing to invest in the system with conse-
quent participation in the design, development, construction
including the provision of equipment), establishment, mainten-
ance, operation and ownership of the system .... 20
Reference was also made to the desire to provide an efficient and
economical service consistent with the most equitable use of the radio
spectrum for the benefit of all nations, and to the need for the establish-
ment of a single global system:
The Governments signatory to this Agreement,
Desiring to establish a single global commercial communications
satellite system as part of an improved global communications network
which will provide expanded telecommunications services to all areas of
the world and which will contribute to world peace and understanding;
Believing that it is desirable to conclude interim arrangements
providing for the establishment of a single global commercial communica-
tions satellite system at the earliest possible date, pending the working out
of definitive arrangements for the organization of such a system;
Agree as follows ......
The reference to a single global system has caused a great deal of stress
inasmuch as there are indications that there will, indeed, be a number of
international satellite systems in the future. The United States position
has always strongly favored a single system, and in fact the United
States had suggested the addition of a paragraph to Article I of the
Agreement that would have explicitly bound the signatories to a single
system and would have pledged them not to participate in any pro-
gram (with the exception of any system necessitated by unique govern-
mental needs). This paragraph was not included,22 however, and the
efforts of the Canadians, Japanese, Germans, and French to develop
satellite capabilities indicate that the universalist principle will be frag-
mented.
The situation will be further complicated by the fact that the Soviet
Union is expanding its international satellite system in direct com-
20. Agreement, supra note 17, Preamble.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. See Colino, Intelsat: Doing BEainess in Outer Space, 6 CoLum. J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 40 (1967).
23. The countries presently co-operating in the Russian system include Bulgaria,
Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Roumania, and
Czechoslovakia.
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petition to the INTELSAT scheme with an eye toward both the revenue
that additional users would bring and the political prestige of developing
the dominant global system. To these ends, the Soviet Union has
developed an extensive communication satellite system based on the
Molnya I satellites (placed in twelve-hour eliptical orbits) which provide
communications between various points in U.S.S.R. territory." The
system is completed by twenty "Orbita" earth stations which are the
reception points for the television transmissions. The Russians emphasize
the use of this system for the one-way (radial) transmission of sound
and television programs which are received by the ground stations and
then transmitted via land lines to local television centers where they are
retransmitted for reception by domestic television receivers. (The satellite
itself, has a directional antenna pointed at the earth and a forty watt
transmitter which is one of the most powerful yet used by a communica-
tion satellite.)
There were distinct operational phases to the Interim arrangements,
an experimental and operational phase, and succeeding phases during
which the objective was to achieve basic global coverage.2" The first
phase involved a synchronous satellite based on the NASA Syncom
design, the INTELSAT I (Early Bird), the first commercial com-
munications satellite, launched on April 6, 1965, which set the pattern
for further developments. This launching was followed by the INTEL-
SAT II satellites,"8 each of which had a capacity for some 300 telephony
circuits and could be used for television transmission. While INTELSAT
I satellites only provided for transmissions between two earth stations,
INTELSAT II satellites could carry simultaneous transmissions from
several earth stations. At the end of 1967 there were fourteen permanent
earth stations and two temporary ones being used in connection with the
24. Transmissions are within the 800-1000 Mc/s range. However, the sound for the
television transmissions is not transmitted separately, but rather the sound signals are
transmitted by width modulation of pulses emitted in intervals when there is no picture
transmission (line blanking intervals). This system, based on the use of television signal
redundancy, does not necessitate widening the radio frequency band.
25. Agreement, Art. I (a).
26. INTELSAT II synchronous satellites were launched on Jan. 11, 1967 (over the
Pacific Ocean to connect the United States, Hawaii, Japan, Australia, Thailand, and
the Phillipines) and Mar. 22, 1967 (over the Atlantic Ocean to connect the United States
with Europe). The launching on Oct. 26, 1966, of an INTELSAT II satellite was
partially unsuccessful and provided only limited usage. The radio frequency spectra used
by the INTELSAT II satellites are: (a) earth-to-satellite 6283 to 6409 Mc/s and
(b) satellite-to-earth 4058 to 4184 Me/s. The INTELSAT III satellites will have a
capacity of at least 1000 telephone circuits (compared with 350 for Intelsat II and 240
for Intelsat I) and will utilize (a) earth-to-satellite 5925 to 6425 Mc/s and (b)
satellite-to-earth 3700 to 4200 Mc/s. See Seventh Report, International Telecommunica-
tion Union on Telecommunication and the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Geneva, 1968,
at 35.
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INTELSAT satellites, and there are plans to construct a total of forty
for use with the completed system, including the INTELSAT III and
IV satellites.
The Interim Communications Satellite Committee is responsible for
establishing and operating the space segment of the system, and any
signatory of the Special Agreement with 1.5 per cent or more as an
investment quota can obtain membership on the Committee. 7 Voting in
the Committee is directly proportional to the quota established for
membership. In accordance with the Communications Satellite Act of
1962, Comsat is the entity designated by the United States Government
for participation on the Committee. On significant questions, 9 decision-
making requires the vote of Comsat plus votes of other representatives
totaling 12.5 per cent. On all other matters, only a simple majority is
required, with the exception that questions on the type of space segment
to be established, budget categories, contracts, or satellite launching may
be decided, after sixty days, by a concurring vote of representatives whose
total votes exceed the vote of the representative with the largest vote by
not less than 8.5 per cent. While earth stations are not included in the
Agreement, there is the necessity for approval by the Committee pursuant
to Article Seven of the Special Agreement before the space segment can be
utilized."0 In practical terms, the quota subscriptions of the signatories are
contributions toward the costs of the design, development, construction
and establishment of the space segment which are paid in accordance with
the provisions of the Special Agreement.2
In addition to being the United States member of the consortium
and representative on the Committee, Comsat has two further functions.
The first is:
The Communications Satellite Corporation, incorporated under
the laws of the District of Columbia (herein referred to as the
Corporation) shall, pursuant to the general policies of the Com-
mittee and in accordance with specific determinations which may
be made by the Committee, act as the manager in the design,
27. Agreement at Art. IV (a), (b). Signatories with less than 1.5 per cent can
combine their quotas to obtain membership.
28. Id., at Art. V(a), Art. V(b).
29. Among the matters considered to be significant in Article V are questions as to
the choice or type of space segment to be established, the establishment of general stan-
dards for approval of the Earth stations, major category budget decisions on additional
contributions, approval on matters relating to satellite launching, and approval of quotas.
30. Agreement, at Art. VII. Article Seven of the Special Agreement considers the
technical characteristics of the Earth station, the general standards established by the
ITU Committees, the technical limitations on multiple access, and the necessity for
geographical dispersion. It also specifies the form and procedure for an application.
31. Id., at Art. VI(a). Section (b) provides that additional contribution can be
requested up to 100,000,000 dollars, but over that figure a special conference of the
signatories to the Special Agreement would have to be convened. For contribution pro-
cedure, see Special Agreement, Arts. 3, 4, 5, and 6.
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development, construction, establishment, operation and main-
tenance of the space segment.32
The second is that Comsat functions as a user of the space segment
through the earth stations it operates. Thus Comsat pays the space
segment charge to INTELSAT, and in return receives its share from
the INTELSAT revenues in proportion to its investment quota. The
investment quota of Comsat was originally sixty-one per cent as com-
pared with 30.5 per cent for European signatories, and 8.5 per cent
divided among Australia, Canada, and Japan.3
The Special Agreement provided in Article Fourteen for the for-
mulation of a Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration (to be drafted
by a group of legal experts) which would consider disputes arising in
connection with the Special Agreement or in connection with the rights
and obligations of the signatories. This Supplementary Agreement pro-
vided that legal disputes concerning the terms of the Agreement or the
Special Agreement, could be brought before the arbitral tribunal. Each
party to the dispute selected one member of the tribunal, and these two
members then chose the president of the tribunal from a panel of legal
experts selected every two years by the Committee. 4 All decisions of the
tribunal were binding and if the Committee was a party, any finding that
a Committee decision was null and void was binding on all signatories."'
On December 31, 1968 the Interim Communications Satellite Com-
mittee issued its report as provided for in Article IX of the Interim Agree-
ment concerning the definitive arrangements to be made for an international
32. Agreement, Art. VIII. Specific functions of Comsat as manager are listed in
Article Twelve of the Special Agreement and require it to (a) prepare and submit to the
Committee the annual program and budgets; (b) recommend to the Committee the type
or types of space segment to be established; (c) plan, conduct, arrange for and co-operate
in studies, design work and development for improvement of the space segment; (d)
operate and maintain the space segment .... It also furnishes information for Committee
representatives, makes arrangements for specialist participation in projects, and arranges
for the distribution of inventions, technical data, and information arising from jointly
financed work to be disclosed to each signatory.
33. The original quotas, by country, were as follows: Australia (2.75); Austria
(0.2) ; Belgium (1.1) ; France (6.1) ; Germany (6.1) ; Ireland (0.35) ; Italy (2.2) ;
Japan (2.0); Netherlands (1.0) ; Norway (0A); Portugal (0.4); Spain (1.1) ; Sweden
(0.7) ; Switzerland (2.0) ; United Kingdom (8.4) ; U.S.A. (61); Vatican City (0.05).
Article XII (c) of the Agreement provides for a pro rata reduction of quotas to
accommodate additional signatories provided that the combined original quotas of all
signatories to the Special Agreement other than the signatories listed above do not
exceed seventeen per cent out of 100 per cent. The new quotas are decided upon by the
Committee. Agreement, Art. V, (c) (ix); XII (a) (ii); XII (b). The United
States quota presently stands at fifty-four per cent.
34. Supplementary Agreement, opened for signature on June 4, 1965; entered into
force on Nov. 21, 1966. Disputes may also be considered which bear on other agreements
relating to the Interim arrangements if the parties agree; Art. 2 (c). Since other means
of settlement must be exhausted, advisory opinions are not considered; Art. 2 (a) and
11 (c).
35. Id., at Art. 11 (c).
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global system. Further, the United States, under an obligation found in
Article IX, convened a Plenipotentiary Conference on Definitive Arrange-
ments for the International Telecommunication Satellite Consortium in
Washington from February 24 through March 21, 1969. Ninety-six
member and non-member countries participated in discussions in four
Committees and numerous Working Groups.
There was controversy over a number of points pertaining to the
scope and content of the definitive arrangements. Arguments were put
forward to the effect that "single global system" was ambiguous, that the
status and relative priority of domestic communication was of concern,
and that the composition of any assembly created should be under direct
government control and not comprised of telecommunication operating
agencies. Some countries favored the interationalization of the manage-
ment under a director general, while others such as the United States
stressed efficient management. General support was given to the proposi-
tion that INTELSAT should be established as a legal entity rather than
continuing as a joint venture without legal personality, and the question
was raised as to whether the signatories would enjoy limited liability if
INTELSAT were given separate legal status. There was also debate
over whether "use" of the system was to be determined by total activity,
international activity only, or international activity plus domestic com-
munication that crossed international boundaries, in determining invest-
ment shares and voting power. Finally, on the issue of procurement
policy there was discussion as to whether the geographical spreading of
contracts should be encouraged.
The complexity of the issues involved led to a decision to adjourn the
Conference and to create an intersessional Preparatory Committee to
develop draft articles to be considered when the Conference reconvenes
on November 18, 1969.36 Since the Committee may postpone the reconven-
ing of the Conference, it must be remembered that during the period of
renegotiation the Interim arrangements will continue in force.
THE DEFINITIVE INTELSAT ARRANGEMENTS
The definitive arrangements for a global commercial satellite system
will be concluded within the context of the present arrangements (par-
ticularly the statements to the effect that the Preamble of the Interim
Agreement should be respected, that the system should be open to all
States who are members of the I.T.U., that the investments made
under the Interim Arrangement should be respected, and that all parties
should have an opportunity to contribute to the determination of general
36. Report of the United States Delegation to the Plenipotentiary Conference on
Definitive Arrangements for the International Telecommunication Satellite Consortium
(First Session), Washington, D.C., Feb. 24-Mar. 21, 1969. The Preparatory Com-
mittee will be representative and will attempt to resolve all outstanding areas of con-
troversy. However, no country will be bound by the Committee Report.
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policy) and in light of the respective governmental positions on the
desirability of participating in a single global telecommunications system.
The United States policy on the continuation of INTELSAT was
outlined by President Johnson in his message to Congress on com-
munication policy on August 14, 1967."7 The declaration of United
States policy favoring the development of a commercial communications
satellite system in conjunction with other nations (found in the 1962
Communications Satellite Act) was reiterated, as was the statement from
the Preamble of the Interim Agreement to the effect that a single global
system should be established. The objectives of these two statements were
reaffirmed, the availability of United States technical and financial
assistance to participating developing countries was mentioned, and a
number of suggestions for further discussion were made. The topics for
discussion included consideration of a ceiling on the voting power of
any single nation, the creation of a formal assembly to facilitate decision-
making by all signatories, the making available of foreign personnel to
Comsat as it carries out its managerial function, and a continued exchange
of technical information coupled with a wider distribution of procurement
contracts. These statements were supported by a pronouncement to the
effect that the United States should take no action in the establishment of
a domestic system which is incompatible with support for a global
system."a Assuming the possibility of the development of a regional
system which would carry some international traffic in addition to domes-
tic and regional transmissions, President Johnson indicated that INTEL-
SAT members should adhere to INTELSAT supervision in any use of
domestic or regional satellites. This supervision would include coordina-
tion of design to allow for interconnection, and technical regulation con-
cerning orbit assignment, frequency allocation, and harmful interference.
An invitation was also extended to the Soviet Union and the nations of
Eastern Europe to join INTELSAT.
The Soviet Union had raised several objections to the INTELSAT
structure while at the same time developing its competing Molnya
system and negotiating with several signatories to the INTELSAT
Agreement for future use of their system. The first objection pertained
to the policy decision made to by-pass both the United Nations and the
International Telecommunication Union in the establishment of INTEL-
37. 57 D=i'. STATE BUu.. 296 (1967).
38. In conjunction with this, President Johnson announced the appointment of
a task force of government officials to make a comprehensive study of communications
policy which would include discussion of whether the United States would be in a
stronger position if it promulgated legislation to permit the merger of the international
carriers, whether Comsat should be allowed to contract directly with users other than
the international common carriers, and whether additional United States communication
capacity should be through surface cables, satellites, or other technologies.
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SAT. The answer given was that the high financial commitment in-
volved precluded either U.N. or I.T.U. control since neither organization
would be willing to support such a financial undertaking nor assume
operational responsibility for the project. A further Russian objection
was that the weighted voting procedure was incompatible with the prin-
ciple of sovereign equality. To this objection, it was pointed out that in
numerous international organizations where substantial investments were
involved, systems of weighted voting were used.39 It has been suggested
that the Soviet Union would have difficulty developing an international
satellite system to compete with INTELSAT since the INTELSAT
system signatories account for approximately ninety per cent of the
world's telecommunication traffic, leaving only ten per cent for the
Soviet system. One implication might be that the Soviet Union would
use their system for propaganda purposes, to an extent which would
depend solely on how much propaganda the receiving country would
tolerate.4"
The political implications of the establishment of a global tele-
communications system are indicated not only by the Russian criticism
of the INTELSAT system and their attempts to create a competing
system, but also by the efforts of various European and other nations to
develop the technology to allow them to establish their own systems. If
these systems were used for domestic purposes, there would be no conflict
with the INTELSAT scheme, but if regional systems emerge from these
domestic systems then there could be direct conflict. While it is possible
to interpret the meaning of "single" as expressed in the Preamble of the
Interim Agreement to allow for the development of regional systems
provided that there was only one international system, there is no reason
why regional satellites could not be interconnected to provide at least
limited competition for an international system, the result of which could
be detrimental to the financial state of the international system. Alter-
natively, arrangements could be established whereby regional systems are
interconnected into the international system when transmissions between
continents were necessary. This possibility leads to yet another interpre-
tation of "single" which would allow for a number of international
satellite systems, INTELSAT being one of them, which would be
interconnected into a single global system.
39. Examples of such organizations are the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corpora-
tion, and the International Development Association. See Simsarian, Interim Arrange-
inents for Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, 59 Am. J. INT'L L.
344, 349-51 (1965).
40. Panel Discussion, International Co-operation in Satellite Communication Sys-
tems, 1967 PROc. Amt. Soc'Y INT'L L. 48.
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Each of these alternatives, however, disregards the political realities
of a situation in which it has proven impossible to obtain international
agreement over the system to be used for color television transmisson,
and where television network interconnections are predetermined by State
boundaries rather than by interest in programming or the social desira-
bility of cooperation. The problem of incompatibility is theoretically
capable of resolution by reference to the cost economies which would
result from the ability to interconnect systems, the logical conclusion
being that one global commercial communications system would provide
for the greatest economies of scale and the least likelihood of problems
concerning the allocation of orbits for the synchronous satellites involved
in the system.
It is suggested that while the resolution of the problems relating to
the financial viability of a single system versus multiple systems will rest
with the responsible organizations (INTELSAT or its successor, and
whatever other systems are established), the technical problems of orbit
allocation as well as frequency allocation should be the primary re-
sponsibility of the International Telecommunication Union. In fact, the
recognition of increased I.T.U. responsibility with regard to global satel-
lite telecommunication could be written into the definitive arrangements for
INTELSAT. It would appear preferable to consider this course
of action, which would create a significant area of responsibility for the
I.T.U. while maintaining financial and operational control within
INTELSAT, since it would introduce into the over-all structure
an area of control that would be under the aegis of an international
agency-specifically a specialized agency of the United Nations
-in which sovereign equality is dominant. This proposal would
have the benefit of placing the considerable technical expertise
of the I.T.U. more directly at the disposal of the permanent INTELSAT
organization which fact will become increasingly important when the
proliferation of satellite systems creates problems of ordered frequency
usage and, specifically, problems concerning the control of direct broad-
casting from satellites. This proposal would, at the same time, allow for
the continuation of the international business consortium structure with
ownership quotas established under intergovernmental agreement and
determined by the share of traffic generated subject to frequent alteration
depending on actual usage figures.
Further, alterations in the organization of the definitive consortium
to provide for a formal assembly and a ceiling on voting power should
be accommodated within a structure where the degree of financial con-
tribution is recognized and directly proportional to voting rights rather
than within an international business structure controlled by an inter-
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national administrative and technical staff. This should be done, first,
because the necessary technical staff would be available to the venture
through inclusion of a role for the I.T.U. in the definitive agreement, and
second, because it is unrealistic to suppose that governments would invest
in a system in varying proportions and then relinquish financial control
in favor of an international body whose decision-making process would be
determined by a majority vote of the nations involved. It is suggested
that the implementation of any plan which did not consider financial
investment would almost surely result in the development of competing
regional systems which would run contrary to the idea of a single inter-
national system, or at the least result in the withdrawal or splitting of
State financial contributions to allow for domestic research and develop-
ment of international satellite communications. Thus, pressure for a one
nation, one vote alternative could have the effect of encouraging national
and regional responses to the detriment of the international cooperation
thus far achieved by the Interim Agreement.
A United States proposal for the definitive arrangements envisions
voting weighted according to investment quotas in a scheme requiring .a
two-thirds majority for decisions on important matters (such as those
mentioned in Article V of the Interim Agreement) and a requirement
that no signatory be allowed more than a fifty per cent vote. 1 Thus any
signatory with more than a one-third investment quota would have a
veto. While this would maintain the Comsat veto, it would make it
possible for others to obtain it. Even though the continuation of the
veto could result in the collapse of the system, it is more likely that the
conditions under which a veto could be used could be balanced against
agreements extracted from various signatories pertaining to their con-
tinued use of the system even in the face of competitive alternatives." The
41. The Times, (London) Oct. 12, 1967, at 22, col. 4.
42. Several alternative suggestions have been made regarding the use of the veto.
One possibility is to give a selective veto to all signatories having more than a specific
investment quota-for example, ten per cent. The restriction would be that the veto
could only be used on matters affecting their international telecommunication. "For
example, the United States would agree to have a veto only over those INTELSAT
activities involving international communications for which Comsat will be supplying
circuits to a domestic common carrier." Trooboff, INTELSAT: Approaches to the
Renegotiation, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J. 55 (1968). The idea of attaching the veto to actual
participation in a particular service and using this as the explanation of what is meant
by "affect" would result in a virtual negation of the effectiveness of the veto since (a)
a signatory could most easily be affected by plans for a satellite service that did not
directly involve that signatory's use in the sense that priorities and financial expendi-
tures would be involved, (b) it is most unlikely that a signatory will wish to use the
veto when a service involving his State is being considered, and (c) in any event, this
changes the basis of the veto from financial contribution and replaces it with a concept
of quasi-equality based partially on financial contribution and partially on the artificial
concept of immediacy of interest.
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fact that many decisions have been made by the Interim Committee with-
out resort to the formal voting procedure indicates that the question of
the veto may not be controlling during the renegotiations.
Additional problems relative to the definitive agreement concern
the continuation of Comsat as manager of the consortium and the
position of the developing countries in the over-all system. It has been
suggested that the functions of manager might be taken over by an
internationalized body of civil servants, but it would seem that the same
difficulties would result as when general control by an international
administrative staff was considered. As to the special case of the develop-
ing countries, it would seem desirable to recognize the participation of
these countries in terms of furthering the goals of political stability and
cultural advancement supplemented by whatever technical and financial
aid programs are made available by individual States. The potential
effects of direct broadcasting from satellites or even the use of ground
stations in these countries to rebroadcast international programming
should be considered. One means by which the participation of these
countries could be increased would be through the implementation of the
suggestion made in President Johnson's speech for the creation of a
formal assembly, and provision for the allotment of places on the Com-
mittee based on geographic distribution. It has been suggested that five
new seats on the Committee could be reserved for one representative
from each of the five continental areas. The representatives would be
chosen by the communications entities within the respective geographic
areas not already represented on the Committee with the proviso that a
system of rotation could be devised to mitigate internal dissension regard-
ing the choice of a representative within a given geographic area and also
that a right of appeal to the Committee could be created to allow con-
sideration of the claim by a small quota country if its continental rep-
resentative were unwilling to act on behalf of that country.48 The
feasibility of this plan will depend partly on the defined scope of the
Committee responsibilities subsequent to the negotiations, the desirability
of modifying the investment quota voting procedure, and political and
other benefits to be derived from increased small quota country participa-
tion in the decision-making processes.
The problem of the degree of involvement in the consortium is
present even in the case of the conditions under which the Soviet Union
might be persuaded to join in the definitive organization. The 1967
Presidential address on communications policy considered the possibility
of linking the Russian Molnya system with INTELSAT coupled with
43. Id., at 68.
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the revision of the investment and voting ratios within INTELSAT
based on the anticipated Russian use of the system." One difficulty is
that the actual Soviet usage would be so low that the investment quota
it received might not even reach the 1.5 per cent necessary for member-
ship on the Committee. Even if the investment quota did reach 1.5 per
cent it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would be satisfied with only
membership on the committee devoid of a veto. While it has been
suggested that the Soviet Union could commit itself in advance to the
purchase of more units of satellite utilization than its traffic would re-
quire on the assumption that its international traffic would eventually
justify the purchase of the additional units, 5 it is most unlikely that the
Soviet Union would be willing to purchase sufficient units to obtain the
veto.
While the involvement of all signatories to a definitive agreement in
the decision-making process of the organization is significant in terms of
policy, the underlying rationale for its importance may lie more in terms
of satisfying a desire for domestic technological advancement than in
concern over political equality. The predominance of the American techno-
logical capability has resulted in a wide discrepancy between the amount
of contractual business conducted by United States concerns in relation
to the European contribution, even though the Interim Agreement sought
to disperse the allocation of contracts to some extent. 8 It would appear
to be desirable to maintain the apportionment process in its present form
which allows for the geographical distribution of contracts in direct
proportion to investment quotas when the proposals are of com-
parable quality but not to sacrifice the paramount requirement
for the best equipment and services to a program of subsidies
to the aerospace industries of member countries. Plans to alter the
procurement procedure (through the implementation of procedures where-
by a State could subsidize the contract offering of its industry or whereby
consortia of countries would be allowed to bid for contracts con-
ditioned on their undertaking to allocate the sub-contracts in proportion
44. See supra note 37, at 300.
45. Trooboff, supra note 42, at 80-81.
46. Article X of the Interim Agreement provides that:
In considering contracts and in exercising its other responsibilities, the Com-
mittee and the Corporation as manager shall be guided by the need to design,
develop and procure the best equipment and services at the best price for
the most efficient conduct and operation of the space segment. When proposals
or tenders are determined to be comparable in terms of quality, c.i.f. price and
timely performance, the Committee and the Corporation as manager shall
also seek to ensure that contracts are so distributed that equipment is
designed, developed and procured in the States whose Governments are
Parties to this Agreement in approximate proportion to the respective quotas
of their corresponding signatories to the Special Agreement....
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to the investment quotas in INTELSAT)4" would not seem to alter the
basic premises of the Interim arrangements and would at the same time
place the burden of financial support for developing domestic industry on
the respective governments in the first instance and require regional
cooperation in procurement policies in the second instance.
In sum, while the problems of cost sharing and capital contribution
and their relation to actual use of a global satellite communications system
are significant in determining the criteria for voting in the INTELSAT
consortium, they may be only preliminary in nature when compared with
the future need for cooperation in the ordering and control of a global
satellite communication system that is technologically sophisticated to the
degree that it is capable of transmitting broadcasts directly to home
receivers without the interposition of a national ground station. In this
situation it has been suggested that the distribution of votes solely in
proportion to use would not reflect the political element in international
decision-making, and that other factors would have to be dealt with in
combining political and functional considerations."
As early as 1962 mention was made of the necessity of comprehen-
sive controls over space communication satellites that would include the
regulation of program content,"9 and it appears that the problem of
control involves not only the renegotiation of the INTELSAT Interim
Agreement with emphasis on the organizational aspects and the problems
of investment quotas and use requirements, but also the problems of
frequency allocation for communications satellites, standards of com-
patibility, regulation of the form and content of direct broadcasting from
satellites, and the prevention of the violation of national sovereignty by
unauthorized broadcasts originating from communications satellites in
outer space. While the INTELSAT renegotiations will concentrate upon
corporate changes which will reflect relative bargaining strength based on
technological competence and investment capabilities, it is suggested that
some thought should also be given to these other problem areas which
may prove to be of greater significance in the long run and which involve
the regulatory capacity of the I.T.U.
47. Trooboff, supra note 42, at 73-74.
48. Chayes, International Satellite Communications: Questions for 1969 (Part II)
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 22, 1967, at 4, col. 1.
49. Estep & Kearse, Space Communications and the Law: Adequate International
Control After 1963? 60 MICH. L. Rlv. 899 (1962) :
If an international body is given jurisdiction over the space communication
satellites, the problem of regulating program content becomes absolutely crucial.
Experience irn the United States with allocation of channels by a licensing
procedure certainly does not justify any hopes that international licensing
vill be a matter solely of technical engineering accommodations.
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THE I.T.U. AND OUTER SPACE TELECOMMUNICATION
In answer to a question which concerned a challenge to the compe-
tence of the International Telecommunication Union concerning satellite
telecommunication, I.T.U. Secretary-General Mili replied in part:
In any event, it is certain that all telecommunications problems
are the sole competence of the ITU, including problems relating
to telecommunication by satellite. I have already had the op-
portunity of saying that satellite telecommunications must be
integrated harmoniously into the world network. It therefore
logically follows that the ITU must be responsible for co-ordinat-
ing the activities of the various countries in the field. That is
quite normal; it is a perfectly logical development. The ITU
will certainly continue in the future to deal with satellite links
as it has done in the past for other means of telecommunication."0
While it has been suggested that past I.T.U. regulation of telecommunica-
tion has not been entirely successful and thus may not be so in regard to
outer space broadcasting,51 it is fair to say that inasmuch as the I.T.U. is
limited to consideration of the technical and operational aspects of tele-
communication, within this frame of reference it has had the problems of
space telecommunication under consideration for some time.
General Competence
In 1959, at the Ninth Plenary Assembly of the C.C.I.R. (Interna-
tional Radio Consultative Committee) in Los Angeles, a Study Group
(S.G. IV) was established to deal with outer space communications. This
was further implemented by a request from the Administrative Radio
Conference (Resolution No. 7, 1959) asking the C.C.I.R. to study radio
emissions from satellites and more sophisticated space vehicles. These
two actions were communicated to the United Nations and other inter-
national organizations by the Plenipotentiary Conference (Resolution
No. 34), which also accepted the recommendation of the Administrative
Radio Conference that an Extraordinary Administrative Conference be
held in 1963.
The Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (Oct. 30 to
Nov. 8,1963, Geneva) was attended by some 400 delegates from seventy
I.T.U. Member countries, and had for its major task the allocation of
radio frequencies for outer space activities and the revision of the Table
50. 35 TELEComm. J. 240 (1968).
51. Doyle, Communication Satellites: International Organization for Development
and Control, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 447 (1967); Cota, The International Telecommunication
Union as a Regulatory Body, 28 TELECOMM. J. 340 (1961).
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of Frequency Allocations to accommodate this new occurrence. The last
revision had been in'Geneva in 1959, at which time only one per cent of
the allocated frequency spectrum was made available for outer space. The
increase in 1963 was to fifteen per cent, allocations being on a shared or
exclusive basis with frequency bands totalling 6076.462 Mc/s for the
various space services of which 2800 Mc/s were for communications satel-
lites on a shared basis with other services. 2 The Conference also pro-
duced a series of resolutions and recommendations, dealing with the order-
ing of future action. Members and Associate Members were to make
data available to the permanent organs of the I.T.U.; there would be an
annual review of space activities by the Administrative Council for the
purpose of making recommendations for future Extraordinary Adminis-
trative Conferences to work out agreements on frequency assignments;
and the procedures adopted by the 1963 Conference were to be used for
the notification and registration of space frequency assignments until al-
tered by future conferences. An additional recommendation provided
that the usual methods of sending distress signals could be used by space-
craft as well as the special 20.007 Mc/s frequency designated by the Con-
ference for this purpose."
Several recommendations were more controversial in their long-run
effect. The International Radio Consultative Committee was urged to
expedite its studies on broadcasting from satellites with particular em-
phasis on the complexities of direct broadcasting from satellites into pri-
vate homes. The problem of direct broadcasting has been a cause of con-
cern to the commercial communication companies responsible for the de-
velopment and maintenance of ground stations and domestic land lines.
There were also subsidiary matters such as the program content control
of broadcasts originating from beyond national boundaries that would
have to be solved eventually by the Committee. A final recommendation
stated the general principle that all Members and Associate Members of
the I.T.U. had a right to the "equitable and rational" use of the frequency
52. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, FROM SEIAPHoRE TO SATELLITE
300 (1965). A special feature of the Conference had been a Telstar II satellite link
between Geneva and New York City. European delegates saw and heard the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, while those at the U.N. saw and heard the reply of the
Secretary-General of the I.T.U. There was also a telephone link via Syncom II between
Geneva and New York. This was accomplished through land lines from Geneva to
Rota, Spain and the U.S.N.S. Kingsport where the link was made with the satellite, and
then to the ground station at Lakehurst, New Jersey, where land lines completed the
circuits to New York and Washington, D.C.
53. A further recommendation called for the I.T.U. Aeronautical Conference to
provide high frequency channels with bands between 2850 Kc/s and 22 Mc/s for the
communications of transport airspace vehicles flying between points on the Earth's
surface both within and beyond the atmosphere. Id., at 301.
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bands allocated for space communications, and hence that the utilization
and exploitation of these frequencies should be subject to "international
agreements based on principles of justice and equity permitting the use
and sharing of allocated frequency bands in the mutual interest of all na-
tions."54  The conscious attempt to equate "justice and equity" with the
"mutual interest of all nations" was more easily drafted in the Recom-
mendation than amenable to practical implementation. The thought that
there was some plan for frequency allocation in which the interests of all
nations could be accounted for indicated the beginning of a change in
I.T.U. policy orientation. It must be remembered that although these
recommendations had no binding legal effect on the parties involved, they
nevertheless served as an indication of trends and majority opinion in the
I.T.U.
The 1965 Plenipotentiary Conference in Montreux issued a general-
ized Resolution (No. 24) on "Telecommunication and the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space." After recalling United Nations General Assem-
bly Resolution 1712 (XVI) which provided that satellite telecommunica-
tion should be available to all nations on a global and nondiscriminatory
basis, and U.N.G.A. Resolution 1962 (XVII) which set forth the legal
principles for State action in the exploration and use of outer space, it
called for the Secretary General and the Administrative Council of the
I.T.U. to continue informing the United Nations and its specialized agen-
cies of the progress made in space telecommunication and included an
offer of cooperation by the Union in further U.N. studies. The concept
of the global use of space telecommunication was furthered by the call for
Members to promote the principle that "all countries should have equal
opportunity to use space telecommunication facilities."" This wording
could be interpreted to mean that only equal opportunity need be given
and that there was no further obligation to share in the development of
the system. On the other hand, the concern of the I.T.U. with telecom-
munication in developing areas indicated that some form of substantive
cooperation would be forthcoming. In their Opinion No. 2 the Plenipo-
tentiary Conference suggested the establishment, as soon as possible, of
regional centers for the study of space telecommunications financed
through the United Nations Special Fund.5"
Expanded Definitions
The I.T.U. has developed a set of definitions relating to space tele-
54. Id., at 301, 304. Final Acts of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Con-
ference, [1963] 15 U.S.T. 887, T.I.A.S. No. 5603.
55. I.T.C. (Montreux, 1965) Resolution No. 24, at 203-04 (emphasis added).
56. Id., at Opinion No. 2, at 233.
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communication which have been added to the Radio Regulations. An
interpretation of "Space Service" provides the base for the new definitions.
It is defined as a radiocommunication, service between Earth stations and
space stations, or between space stations, or
between Earth stations when the signals are retransmitted by
space stations, or transmitted by reflection from objects in space,
excluding reflection or scattering by the ionosphere or within
the Earth's atmosphere."
An initial question can be raised as to why the definition revisions relate
to radio communication which itself is defined in Annex Two of the In-
ternational Telecommunication Convention as "Telecommunication by
means of radio waves,""8 rather than to "Telecommunication" which in-
cludes "Any transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, writ-
ing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical
or other electromagnetic means."5  Hence communication by laser has,
by definition, been excluded from consideration in the "space" revisions.
Arguably, television transmissions would be excluded from the revisions
under the heading of "radiocommunication" if one drew a distinction be-
tween sound transmissions and television transmissions.
An Earth station is defined as "A station in the space service located
either on the Earth's surface, including on board a ship, or on board an
aircraft,"6 while a space station is "A station in the space service located
on an object which is beyond, is intended to go beyond, or has been be-
yond, the major portion of the Earth's atmosphere."0 1 If an Earth station
is to be classified within the space service, what is to be done with trans-
mission stations that have multiple uses? Will they be classified as Earth
stations only if fifty per cent or more of their transmissions fall within
the three categories of the space service? Is a relay station located on a
ship or aircraft that re-transmits a signal from a satellite to a ground
station to be considered an Earth station? Further, what of a transmis-
sion station on board an aircraft that has flown beyond the major portion
of the Earth's atmosphere as the X-15 and others are capable of doing-is
this an Earth station or a space station? The definition of space station as
one on an "object" which has been beyond the major portion of the Earth/s
atmosphere suggests a boundary for outer space which clashes with the
57. I.T.U. Radio Regs. (Geneva, 1959) Revised, 1963, Sec. IIA, para. 84AC
[hereinafter cited as I.T.U. Radio Regs.].
58. I.T.C. (Montreux, 1965) Annex 2, para. 412.
59. Id., at para. 409 (emphasis added).
60. I.T.U. Radio Regs., at para. 84AD.
61. Id., at para. 84AE.
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sovereignty claims of the major world powers since this designation tends
to bring the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty into operation within
segments of the Earth's atmosphere and creates numerous difficulties for
States desiring to limit the activities of reconnaissance satellites and other
possibly undesirable activities.
Further distinctions are made in the definitions regarding space
services by dividing these services into communication, space research
broadcasting, radionavigation, and meteorological services. The com-
munication-satellite service is a space service
between Earth stations, when using active or passive satellites
for the exchange of communications of the fixed or mobile serv-
ice, or
between an Earth station and stations on active satellites for the
exchange of communications of the mobile service, with a view to
their retransmission to or from stations in the mobile service. 2
An "active satellite" is defined as one which carries a station intended to
transmit or re-transmit radiocommunication signals, while a "passive
Earth satellite" transmits these signals by reflection. 3  However, the
original space service definition excludes reflection "within the Earth's
atmosphere" whereas space stations can be located beyond the major por-
tion of the Earth's atmosphere, but still within the atmosphere, and could
operate to reflect transmission signals. Re-transmission within the at-
mosphere would appear to be included providing that the criteria for
"space station" were met. The requirement that when the communica-
tion takes place between an Earth station and a satellite station, that the
communication must be "of the mobile service"64 and with a view to
re-transmission to other mobile stations, seems to arbitrarily limit the
communication. While it would appear that this provision was meant to
apply to navigation by satellite, a separate provision defines the "Radio-
navigation-Satellite Service" as a service "using space stations on Earth
satellites for the purpose of radionavigation, including in certain cases,
transmission or re-transmission of supplementary information necessary
for the operation of the radionavigation system."65  Thus, it is not clear
62. I.T.U. Radio Regs., at para. 84AG. A communication-satellite Earth station
is an Earth station in the communication-satellite service, and a communication-satellite
space station is a space station in the communication-satellite service on an Earth
satellite. Id., at paras. 84AH-AL
63. Id., at paras. 84AJ-AK.
64. A Mobile Service is a service of radio-communication between mobile and land
stations, or between mobile stations. I.T.C. (Montreux, 1965), Annex 2, para. 416.
65. I.T.U. Radio Regs., at para. 84AQ. A Radionavigation Earth Station is an
Earth station in the radionavigation service, and the space station is defined as one in
the radionavigation-satellite service on an Earth satellite. Id., at paras. 84AR-AS.
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why this latter form of communication satellite transmission must be
limited to the mobile service any more than the first category is restricted.
There is also a distinction made between a communications satellite
service and a broadcasting-satellite service. The latter is
[a] space service in which signals transmitted or re-transmitted
by reflection from objects in orbit around the Earth, are intended
for direction reception by the general public."8
There is no attempt to define in particular terms the Earth and space sta-
tions that would be dedicated to a broadcasting service, yet this was done
with each of the other itemized services. By interpreting the "direct re-
ception" clause to mean that there is no transference of the signal through
a ground station for amplification or to facilitate home reception, the
probable future form of broadcasting satellites is recognized but no al-
lowance is made for broadcasting satellites that utilize a ground link to
re-transmit their programming. There is the further question of whether
the ground station that originates the signal that is to be transmitted or
re-transmitted by reflection from the satellite should be considered a dedi-
cated Earth station. The use of the phrase "intended for reception!' in-
dicates that the criterion for determining the existence of such a service
will be the intent of the parties launching and operating the satellites and
not the actual reception of the transmissions by the general public. The
C.C.I.R. Study Group XI had proposed additional definitions for terms re-
lating to broadcasting from satellites at their Interim Meeting in Palma
de Majorca in 1968 which included further divisions into principle serv-
ices, rural services, and community services, and also distinctions between
direct and indirect distribution in the satellite communication service for
broadcasting.67
Another questionable division of satellite use is that involving the
classification of a space research service as a space service "in which
spacecraft or other objects in space are used for scientific or technological
research purposes.""8 Since all of the probable uses of satellites have
been listed separately, was this category of "space research" intended to
supplement them and simply allow for an expansion of research activities
or was it intended to exclude the consideration of the meteorological
service and others" as research services? This could have particular
66. Id., at para. 84AP.
67. 35 TzElacoAm. J. 241 (1968).
68. I.T.U. Radio Regs., at 84AM. The subsidiary definitions are: Space Research
Earth Station: An Earth station in the space research service, and Space Research
Space Station: A space station in the space research service. Id., at paras. 84AN-AO.
69. "Meteorological-Satellite Service: A space service in which the results of
meteorological observations, made by instruments on Earth satellites, are transmitted to
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significance if special protections were developed for research activities
that would not necessarily apply to other ventures.
In the definition of "space system"-"any group of co-operating
Earth and space stations, providing a given space service and which, in
certain cases, may use objects in space for the reflection of the radio-
communication signals"7 -the use of an active satellite is implicitly ex-
cluded since only transmission by reflection via a passive satellite is
mentioned. However, the definition of "satellite system" includes "any
group of co-operating stations providing a given space service and in-
cluding one or more active or passive satellites."'" There does not appear
to be a clear reason for this distinction.
The only definitions of objects in space are contained in the pro-
visions which define a "spacecraft" as "any type of space vehicle, in-
cluding an Earth satellite or a deepspace probe, whether manned or un-
manned" 2 and "stationary satellite" as "A satellite, the circular orbit of
which lies in the plane of the Earth's equator and which turns about the
polar axis of the Earth in the same direction and with the same period
as those of the Earth's rotation."73 There are numerous simplified def-
initions of scientific terms such as "space telemetering," "orbit," and
"deep space" for telecommunication purposes,74 and a comprehensive list-
ing of the regulations governing the technical characteristics of space
Earth stations by space stations on these satellites." Id., at para. 84AT. Meteorological-
Satellite Earth Sations and Space Stations are these stations in the meteorological-
satellite service with the latter located on an Earth satellite. Id., at paras. 84AU-AV.
70. Id., at para. 84AF.
71. Id., at para. 84AL (emphasis added).
72. Id., at para. 84BH.
73. Id., at para. 84BG.
74. Space Telemetering: The use of telemetering for the transmission from a space
station of results of measurements made in a spacecraft, including those relating to the
functioning of the spacecraft. Maintenance Space Teleinetering: Space telemetering
relating exclusively to the electrical and mechanical condition of a spacecraft and its
equipment together with the condition of the environment of the spacecraft. Space
Telecommand: The use of radiocommunication for the transmission of signals to a space
station to initiate, modify or terminate functions of the equipment on a space object,
including the space station. Space Tracking: Determination of the orbit, velocity or
instantaneous position of an object in space by means of radiodetermination, excluding
primary radar, for the purpose of following the movement of the object. Deep Space:
Space at distances from the Earth equal to or greater than the distance between the
Earth and the Moon. Orbit: The path in space described by the centre of mass of a
satellite or other object in space. Angle of Inclination of an. Orbit: The acute angle
between the plane containing an orbit and the plane of the Earth's equator. Period of
an Object in Space: The time elapsing between two consecutive passages of an object
in space through the same point on its closed orbit. Altitude of the Apogee: Altitude
above the surface of the Earth of the point on the closed orbit where a satellite is at its
maximum distance from the centre of the Earth. Altitude of the Perigee: Altitude
above the surface of the Earth of the point on a closed orbit where a satellite is at its
minimum distance from the centre of the Earth. Id., at paras. 84AW-AZ and 84BA-BF.
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services that includes rules regarding the choice of sites and frequencies,"
power limits,"6 minimum angle of elevation,7 7 and power flux density
limits.
7 1
75. Section VIII: Space Services sharing Frequency Bands with Terrestrial
Services between 1 Gc/s and 10 Gels: Sites and frequencies for Earth stations,
operating frequency bands shared with equal rights between terrestrial and space
services, shall be selected having regard to the relevant recommendations of the CCIR
with respect to geographical separation from terrestrial stations. Id., at para. 470E.
76. (1) Earth Stations in the Communication-Satellite Service.
(2) The mean effective radiated power transmitted by an Earth station in any
direction in the horizontal plane* shall not exceed +55dbW in any 4 kc/s band, except
that it may be increased subject to the provisions of 470H or 4701. However, in no case
shall it exceed a value of +65dbW in any 4 kc/s band.
(3) In any direction where the distance from an Earth station to the boundary
of the territory of another administration exceeds 400 km, the limit of +55dbW in any
4 kc/s band may be increased in that direction by 2 db for each 100 km in excess of
400 km.
(4) The limit of +55dbW in and 4 kc/s band may be exceeded by agreement between
the administrations concerned or affected.
*For the purpose of this Regulation, the effective radiated power transmitted in the
horizontal plane shall be taken to mean the effective radiated power actually transmitted
towards the horizon, reduced by the site-shielding factor that may be applicable. The
value of this site-shielding factor shall be determined as indicated in section 5 of the
Annex to Recommendation No. IA.
(5) The limits given 470G apply in the following frequency bands allocated to
transmission by Earth stations in the communication-satellite service where these are
shared with equal rights with the fixed or mobile service:
4400-4700 Mc/s
5800-5850 Mc/s (for the countries mentioned in 390)
5850-5925 Mc/s (Regions 1 and 3)
5925-6425 Mc/s
7250-7750 Mc/s
7900-8400 Mc/s
Id., at paras. 47OK-M.
77. (1) Earth Stations in the Communication-Satellite Service.
(2) Earth station antennae shall not be employed for transmission at elevation
angles less than three degrees, measured from the horizontal plane to the central axis of
the main lobe, except when agreed to by the administrations concerned or affected.
(3) The limit given in 470L applies in the following frequency bands allocated to
transmission by Earth stations in the communication-satellite service, where these are
shared with equal rights with the fixed or mobile service:
4400-4700 Mc/s
5800-5850 Mc/s (for the countries mentioned in 390)
5850-5925 Mc/s (Regions 1 and 3)
5925-6425 Mc/s
7250-7750 Mc/s
7900-8400 Mc/s
Id., at paras. 470K-M.
78. (1) Communication-Satellite Space Stations.
(a) The total power flux density at the Earth's surface, produced by an emission
from a communication-satellite space station, or reflected from a passive communication-
satellite, where wide-deviation frequency (or phase) modulation is used, shall in no
case exceed -130 dbW/m 2 for all angles of arrival. In addition, such signals shall if
necessary be continuously modulated by a suitable waveform, so that the power flux
density shall in no case exceed -149 dbW/m 2 in any 4 kc/s band for all angles of
arrival.
(b) The power flux density at the Earth's surface, produced by an emission from
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
A most significant addition to the definitions is the one specifying
the steps to be taken to avoid harmful interference by space stations.
The provision reads:
In order to avoid interference: locations of transmitting stations,
and, where the nature of the service permits, locations of receiv-
ing stations shall be selected with particular care; radiation in
and reception from unnecessary directions shall be minimized,
where the nature of the service permits, by taking the maximum
practical advantage of the properties of directional antennae;
the choice and use of transmitters and receivers shall be in
accordance with the provisions of Article 12; space stations
shall be fitted with appropriate devices to quickly terminate their
radio emissions whenever required to do so under the provisions
of these Regulations."9
The selection of sites for transmitting and receiving stations with
particular care places the burden of justification upon the State respon-
a communication-satellite space station, or reflected from a passive communication-
satellite, where modulation other than wide-deviation frequency (or phase) modulation
is used, shall in no case exceed -152 db-W/m 2 in any 4 kc/s band for all angles of
arrival.
(c) The limits given in 4700 and 470P apply in the following frequency bands
allocated to transmission by space stations in the communication-satellite service, where
these are shared with equal rights with the fixed or mobile services:
3400-4200 Mc/s
7250-7750 Mc/s
(2) Meteorological-Satellite Space Stations.*
*In view of the absence of any CCIR Recommendations relative to sharing
between the meteorological-satellite service and other services, power flux density
levels applicable to communication-satellite space stations are extended to meteorological-
satellite space stations.
(a) The power flux density at the Earth's surface, produced by an emission from
a meteorological-satellite space station, where wide-deviation frequency (or phase)
modulation is used, shall in no case exceed -130 dbW/m 2 for all angles of arrival. In
addition, such signals shall if necesary be continuously modulated by a suitable wave-
form, so that the power flux density shall in no case exceed -149 dbW/m 2 in any 4
kc/s band for all angles of arrival.
(b) The power flux density at the Earth's surface, produced by an emission from
a meteorological-satellite space station, where modulation other than wide-deviation
frequency (or phase) modulation is used, shall in no case exceed -152 dbW/m 2 in any
4 kc/s band for all angles of arrival.
(c) The limits given in 470S and 470T apply in the following frequency bands
allocated to transmissions by space stations in the meteorological-satellite service,
shared with equal rights with the fixed or mobile service:
1660-1670 Mc/s
1690-1700 Mc/s
7200-7250 Mc/s
7300-7750 Mc/s
The limits given in 470S and 470T also apply in the band 1770-1790 Mc/s although
the meteorological-satellite service is a secondary service in this band. Id., at paras.
470N-U.
79. Id., at para. 695.
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sible for the entity as is the case with the minimization of non-essential
radiation and reception. The qualifying clause of "where the nature
of the service permits" indicates that there may be some situations where
it is not possible to avoid harmful interference. Further, the clause is
used in reference to receiving stations and problems of radiation in and
reception from unnecessary directions, but not in reference to the locations
of transmitting stations. Since the transmitting stations will usually be
within national territory, the qualifying clause was probably not thought
necessary given the dominance of national sovereignty. In the other
cases, it is presumably the State's responsibility to ensure compliance
within the limits of normal international diplomatic relations. The re-
quirement for the possibility of the immediate termination of radio
emissions on a temporary basis corresponds with the special provision
for the cessation of radio emissions from space stations."0
When interference is suffered by an Earth station, the administration
having jurisdiction over the receiving station as well as that administration
responsible for the Earth station may "approach directly" the administra-
tion controlling the interfering station.8' This presumably means that
diplomatic and other pressures may be exerted to eliminate the inter-
ference. In addition, it was thought important to be able to locate a space
station causing harmful interference, and to that end a provision was
included that allowed the administration having jurisdiction over a
station experiencing interference to request from the offending admin-
istration the "current ephemeral data necessary to allow calculation of
the positions of the space station." 2 Presumably location of the exact
position of the space station would allow for some alteration in antennae
direction or other mechanical change, since the frequency being used
would not be affected by any determination of location. This provision
was inserted because, given the present state of technology, it is not
always possible for a space station to transmit identifying signals for its
radio system,8" and hence the station is identified "by specifying the
angle of inclination of the orbit, the period of the object in space and the
altitudes of apogee and perigee of the space station in kilometers."84
80. Id., at para. 47OV. "Space stations shall be made capable of ceasing radio
emission by the use of appropriate devices that will ensure definite cessation of
emissions." Such control would be by controlling battery life, timing devices, or ground
command.
81. Id., atpara. 711A.
82. Id., at para. 711B.
83. Id., at para. 7351.
84. Id., at para. 737A. The identification of a space transmission station on board a
stationary satellite is by means of a determination of the mean geographical longitude
of the projection of the satellite's position on the surface of the Earth. Id., at para.
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Since Article Forty-eight of the International Telecommunication Con-
vention concerning "Harmful Interference" refers to "All stations,
whatever their purpose," it is clear that space stations are included
within this general regulation and that the revision of the Radio Regula-
tions are primarily intended to clarify terms and facilitate conformity
in international telecommunication.
Specific Considerations
The International Radio Consultative Committee (C.C.I.R.) of
the I.T.U. conducted studies during 1967 on the technical and operational
aspects of space communications and particularly the relative merits of
the three theoretically feasible ways in which satellites could be used to
transmit program material for international broadcasting services. These
three approaches were described as follows:
a) by means of a satellite for point to point relay purposes,
which implies the existence of at least one advanced ground
station in the territory to be covered and also the existence
in that territory of a well-developed terrestrial network
consisting of cables or microwave relay systems, or a mix-
ture of both; this approach is already being applied in a
number of countries;
b) a distribution satellite system, whereby a somewhat more
powerful satellite would transmit to a number of relatively
simple ground stations, which would relay programmes so
received, with the necessary frequency changes, to domestic
or collective receivers within their area of coverage;
c) a direct broadcasting satellite, whereby a signal transmitted
by the satellite would be sufficiently strong to be received
directly by domestic or collective receivers which, however,
would have to be equipped with special antennae and, de-
pending on the frequency used by the satellite, with the
necessary frequency-changing equipment.s
Interest in the possibilities of the above approaches has been increased
due to the inauguration of a training center at Ahmedabad, India, in
conjunction with the experimental satellite communication Earth station
737A. When it is possible to use call signs, they are to consist of two letters followed by
two or three digits. Id., at para. 773A.
85. Seventh Report by International Telecommunication Union on Telecommunica-
tion and the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Geneva, 1968. These studies were pursued
on the basis of texts adopted by the XI Plenary Assembly of the C.C.I.R. (Oslo, 1966).
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located there.8"
At an interim meeting in 1968 a Joint Working Group of C.C.I.R.
Study Groups X (Broadcasting) and XI (Television) considered the
problems of frequency sharing between satellite and terrestrial broad-
casting services and concluded that the use of existing broadcasting bands
for the broadcasting service from satellites, particularly the use of Band
Ten, raised technical problems which required further study by the C.C.I.
R. There was also discussion concerning the exchange of television pro-
grams and the technical standards to be maintained, and the adoption of
a Question entitled "Specifications for Low-cost Television Receivers"
which would enlarge the concept of direct broadcasting by providing for
adequate and low cost television receivers to be made available to develop-
ing countries.
The expectation of numerous satellite capabilities has led the C.C.I.R.
to a consideration of the problem of potential overcrowding of the geo-
stationary orbit, since it is desirable to use synchronous satellites at an
altitude of 22,237 miles above the earth in the plane of the equator. While
the entire orbit is very large, because of population densities, certain sec-
tions of the orbit will be preferred and it is likely that there will be a
tendency to place a number of satellites relatively close to one another. If
this is done, and if they operate on the same frequency, discrimination
between them will depend on the resolving power of the satellite antenna
systems and the Earth station systems. To determine the seriousness of
this problem and to establish technical rules, experiments are being con-
ducted to determine the minimum angle of separation possible. As with
other problems of this type, the technical solution to the problem of over-
crowding of orbital positions will only prove effective to the extent that
a political accord has been reached.
At the second meeting of the World Plan Committee held in Mexico
during 1967 consideration was given to the question of communication by
artificial satellites. The Plan drawn up considers the possibilities of this
mode of telecommunication.8 7 At present, no circuit in the interregional
network is permanently alloted to sound and television. When interna-
tional television broadcasts via satellite are made using INTELSAT I
86. UNESCO is also involved in this project, and has issued a document entitled
"Preparatory study of a pilot project in the use of satellite communication for national
development purposes in India," which discusses the problems of collective antenna
installations and low cost television receivers.
87. See Malek-Asghar, The Mexico City Plan and the Futhore Interregional
Telecommunication Network, 35 TELEcomm. J. 109 (1968); 35 T.comm. J. 3 (1968):
The Plan itself is contained in the ITU publication, GENERAL PLAN FOR THE DEvELOP-
MENT OF THE INTERREGIoNAL TELEcomM UNICATIoN NETWORK, 1967-1970-1975 (1968),
which replaces the Rome Plan publication for 1963 to 1968.
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and II, circuits normally used for telephone usage are withdrawn from
service. However, a list of INTELSAT communication satellite systems
both present and future is included in the Plan,88 and the Earth stations
operating at an interregional level are listed.8" The Russian Molnya I
system is not mentioned in the Mexico City Plan inasmuch as it does not
as yet operate interregionally, but the system probably will be included in
the forthcoming European Plan. The INTELSAT III satellite provides
a two-way television circuit which will be available at all times, and as the
technology advances it is probable that more circuits will be made avail-
able and will have to be taken into consideration in any charting of inter-
regional circuits. The work of the World Plan Committee in this area
could be significant inasmuch as the problem of interconnection must be
anticipated by provision for the standardization of equipment and the
necessary technical arrangements must be created to allow the inter-
connection of terrestrial and satellite systems and perhaps the inter-
connection of satellite systems.
On a more general level, the 23rd Session of the I.T.U. Administra-
tive Council9" passed three resolutions dealing with satellite telecommunica-
tion. They were based on United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
1721 (XVI) and 1802 (XVII) as well as Recommendation No. 10A of
the Extraordinary Administrative Space Radiocommunication Conference
(Geneva, 1963) which stated that all I.T.U. Members and Associate
Members have a right to the equitable and rational use of the frequencies
allocated for space communications, and that the utilization of the fre-
quency spectrum be subject to international agreements based on justice
and equity permitting the use and sharing of allocated frequency bands
in the mutual interest of all nations. The first resolution calls upon the
Secretary-General and the Heads of the permanent organs of the I.T.U.
to draw up a programme of work pertaining to space communications, to
further co-operation between the I.T.U. and other international organiza-
tions having an interest in satellite telecommunication, and finally to draw
up general principles defining the broad lines of I.T.U. activity in this
area with the goal of creating international space telecommunication sys-
tems providing equal facilities for all countries. The second resolution
calls for the convening of a World Administrative Space Radiocommuni-
cations Conference in 1970-1971, the agenda of which will include:
88. 35 TELEcomm. J. 123 (1968). The list includes the operational INTELSAT I
and II satellites, those to be provided under present plans (Intelsat III), and those
under consideration (Intelsat III '/2 and IV).
89. 35 TELECOMM. J. 112 (1968).
90. 35 TELECOMM. J. 291 (1968).
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a) the revision of existing administrative and technical regula-
tions and the adoption of new provisions dealing with space
radio services and the radio-astronomy service that will re-
sult in the efficient use of the spectrum.
b) the consideration and revision of the Radio Regulations per-
taining to the Aeronautical Mobile and Maritime Mobile
Service and to navigation as they concern space techniques.
c) the consideration of additional radio frequency allocations
for the space radio services.
d) the revision and development of technical criteria for fre-
quency sharing between space and terrestrial systems, and
the establishment of criteria for sharing between satellite
systems.
Administrations were also invited to submit proposals for the Agenda of
this Conference which will be considered at the 24th Session of the Ad-
ministrative Council following which a detailed agenda will be formulated.
The third resolution defines the role of the I.T.U. in space communica-
tions and was promulgated to offset the adverse comment by other inter-
national organizations interested in space telecommunication dealing with
the inadequacies of the I.T.U. The preponderant role to be played by the
I.T.U. is emphasized and the basis for this position outlined.
The International Telecommunication Union maintains a very close
relationship with the United Nations, and particularly with the Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. United Nations concern with
the implications of direct broadcasting from satellites was evidenced in
Paragraph Thirteen of General Assembly Resolution 2260 (XXII) en-
titled "Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space."
This Paragraph requested the Committee to study the technical feasibility
of communications by direct broadcasts from satellites, the current and
foreseeable developments in this field, and the implications of such develop-
ments. Subsequently the Swedish delegation to the Judicial Sub-Commit-
tee proposed a resolution"' which recalled General Assembly Resolution
2260 (XXII) and recommended a study of the question of direct broad-
casting from satellites be made by the Scientific and Technical Sub-Com-
mittee with the assistance of the competent specialized agencies of the
91. Report on The Seventh Session of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, Geneva, June 4-28, 1968. The resolution was accepted unanimously
by the Sub-Committee. A further resolution which recommended to the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that the specialized agencies of the U.N. and the
International Atomic Energy Agency report any problems arising from the use of
outer space within their competence, which would then be discussed by the Legal Sub-
Committee, was unanimously adopted.
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United Nations, which by implication included the I.T.U. There was
also discussion of a draft agreement on liability for damage caused by
objects launched into Outer Space. The relevant part of this draft con-
sidered the proposition that "damage" could include harm caused by
emissions from one space object interfering with the radio equipment of
another space object. However, damages resulting from harmful inter-
ference by or to terrestrial radio stations were thought to be excluded, and
this was the subject of comment by the I.T.U. observers to the Session
with the general reaction of the State delegations being that the matter
raised a number of contentious issues which should be set aside in the in-
terests of meeting the time limit set by the General Assembly for the
completing of a draft of the Convention.
Structural Alternatives
The alternatives open to the I.T.U. to adapt itself to space tele-
communication are limitless and will be debated sharply in the years prior
to the Plenipotentiary Conference in Geneva in 1971. One possibility for
change would be to vest more authority in the International Frequency
Registration Board so that it becomes the arbitrator, if not the judge,92
of frequency disputes. The practical difficulties here involve the develop-
ment of sanctioning procedures and the formulation of a methodology by
which governments could be convinced that this body would utilize cri-
teria for frequency allocations that would take into consideration the
needs of each nation. Then too, provisions would have to be made to
alter frequency allocations in terms of time since if the allocation criteria
changed or the uses of a particular government ceased to fall within the
terms of their original grant, means would have to be available for re-
allocating frequencies without disrupting the entire system.
A redefinition of "telecommunication" 3 has been suggested that
would divide it into its component parts and would allow for I.T.U. de-
velopment beyond the traditional concept of a regulatory function. The
categories would be (a) Terrestrial Telecommunications: those between
stations beneath or in airspace; (b) Orbit/Corridor Telecommunications:
those between any station within airspace and any station beyond airspace
92. The proposal that the I.F.R.B. should develop into an "international court of
justice" to decide on frequency distribution was first made by Uruguay at the 1959
Administrative Radio Conference. I.T.U. Doc. 55-E, Aug. 19, 1959, at 87, Minutes of
the Plenary Meetings, Administrative Radio Conf. (Geneva, 1959) reported in Glazer,
Infelix I.T.U.-The Need for Space-Age Revisions to the International Telecontunica-
tion Convention, 23 FED. B.J. 27 (1963).
93. Telecommunication is presently defined as: "Any transmission, emission or
reception of signs, signals, writings, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature
by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic systems." I.T.C. (Montreux, 1965)
Annex. 2, para. 409.
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including stations on celestial bodies; and (c) Space/Celestial Telecom-
munications: those between stations beyond airspace including stations
on celestial bodies. The idea appears to be that the established rules and
regulations governing terrestrial telecommunication could remain as they
are while telecommunication in the latter two categories could be adapted
to meet the developing technical requirements without the necessity for re-
vising all of the standing terrestrial regulations. There is no reason to
believe, however, that scientific and technical motivations will predomin-
ate in any rule-making session for outer space telecommunication any
more than they did in the terrestrial situation. Further, the development
of a different set of rules based on the location of the sending and receiv-
ing station would have the disadvantage of requiring a station that was
capable of sending and receiving all categories of messages to operate un-
der three different sets of rules simultaneously, and thus would not pro-
mote uniformity in telecommunication control. However, if the entire
structure of the I.T.U. were altered and a separate organ created to deal
with the problems of outer space, then the separation would be acceptable.
Such a plan would require the centralization of the functions of the Gen-
eral Secretariat, the CCITT, CCIR, and IFRB, into two bodies; one a
permanent international organ (Universal Telecommunication Commis-
sion), and the other a technical/administrative support organization. The
Commission would receive limited delegations of power from the Admin-
istrative Conferences in the same manner as the I.T.U. Plenipotentiary
Conference now delegates activities to the Administrative Council of the
Union."
It is probable that this structural change would only apply to the
latter two categories of telecommunication (Orbit/Corridor and Space/
Celestial), and even then much more work would need to be done in im-
plementing the new relationships to ensure that they did not revert to the
ordinary form through practice. This points out the major weakness of
any organizational re-structuring that is not predicated on the prior agree-
ment of the parties involved, even if appeal to the International Court of
Justice were to be provided for in the scheme.
To further improve on the arbitral procedures of the I.T.U., even
beyond the procedures of the optional additional protocol establishing
compulsory settlement of disputes, it would be possible to establish a spe-
cialized court patterned after the court responsible for settling European
94. Glazer, supra note 92, at 28-31. The organizational structure of this plan would
be as follows:
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Common Market disputes. 5 There would be recourse to this body only
after diplomatic protest and arbitration had failed. The historical prece-
dent suggested for such a development is found in the terms of the "Inter-
national Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of
Peace" of 1936"8 which provided for ultimate recourse to the Permanent
Court of International Justice or an arbitral tribunal constituted in con-
formity with the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes."7 It is doubtful whether the strength of this precedent will have
much effect in promoting the development of any juridical competence in
space telecommunication, but it does indicate the direction for such de-
velopment if the States involved find that this means for dispute settle-
ment is within their national self-interest.
The question becomes one of determining whether nations will be
willing to invest the I.T.U. or any other international body with rule-mak-
ing authority which would impinge upon national sovereignty. They have
not done this in respect of terrestrial communications and there is no
Plenipotentiary International
Conference Court Administrative
Administrative lof Conferences
Council Justice
Universal
Telecommunication
Commission
I
Director-General
Universal
Telecommunication
Organization
Telegraph Telephone Radio
Division DivisionDivision
D i visiiv isio n
95. Estep, Some International Aspects of Communications Satellite Systems, 58
Nw. U.L. Rav. 259 (1963).
96. 186 L.N.T.S. 301 (1938). This Convention was developed by a conference
sponsored by the League of Nations. The parties agreed to prohibit broadcasts within
their territory that could cause or incite violence and war or any other acts incompatible
with internal security. They further agreed to prohibit the broadcasting of statements
likely to harm international understanding while at the same time pledging themselves
to facilitate broadcasts that would promote understanding and peace. However, there
were reservations of the right to jam among the European and Latin American
signatories.
97. Id., at 311.
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reason to suspect that a different position will be taken regarding outer
space. For the most part, the United Nations pronouncements dealing
with cooperation in outer space and calling for the shared use of com-
munication satellites are idealistic in purpose and form and do not pro-
vide any evidence of a relaxation of national sovereignty.
One possibility is that the provision in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty"
calling for the registration of space vehicles could be expanded in future
drafts or amended to include the need for the registration of the radio
transmitters in space vehicles. This concept of "licensed interspace
correspondence'" would deny to unregistered transmitters any protec-
tion under the Radio Regulations including any right of recourse to the
I.T.U. administrative organs. Illegal activities by registered transmitters
would result in the revocation of their "licensed" status coupled with a
right of appeal to the International Court of Justice once administrative
due process had been exhausted. It is probable, however, that administra-
tive due process would result in an unacceptable time lag since political
concerns and many of the same difficulties that now hinder I.T.U.
activities would come into play. Further, the revocation of a license would
have no real effect unless it were possible to enforce some form of
penalty. Just as many transmitting stations today operate without I.T.U.
approval, so too could outer space transmitters. It might prove more
difficult to locate the source of a broadcast causing harmful interference
in space than if it originated in some terrestrial location. In sum, all of
the problems of the credibility of enforcement of I.T.U. regulations are
only magnified when applied to telecommunication in outer space.
Military Communications Satellites
One specific problem faced by the I.T.U. is that of military installa-
tions for telecommunications in space. Just as it has become futile to
distinguish between peaceful and military uses of outer space generally,
so too is there great difficulty in determining what constitutes a military
communication. The I.T.U. Convention is ambiguous on this point.
Article Fifty-one of the 1965 Convention provides:
98. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Oct. 10, 1967,
[1967] T.I.A.S. No. 6347; 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 644 (1967). See also Art. VI of the
Draft Treaty on Outer Space, the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (The David
Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies) which provides:
No experiment or activity shall be conducted in Outer Space, on the Moon
or on other Celestial Bodies which:
c) causes or is likely to cause interference with terrestrial telecommunica-
tion systems of international space communications systems; without the prior
consent of the United Nations Committee.
99. Glazer, supra note 92, at 29.
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Members and Associate Members retain their entire freedom
with regard to military radio installations of their army, naval
and air forces."'
While this would appear to exempt military services from the provisions
of the International Telecommunication Convention, the following
paragraph in Article Fifty-one provides:
Nevertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, observe
statutory provisions relative to . . . the measures to be taken
to prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the Reg-
ulations concerning the types of emission and the frequencies to
be used, according to the nature of the service performed by
such installations.'""
The overall effect of this paragraph would seem to limit the retention of
freedom of the Members and Associate Members in that they must
observe, as far as possible, the provisions relative to harmful interference
as well as certain sections of the Radio Regulations. In fact, Article
Forty-eight of the Convention which, refers to harmful interference is
phrased in an all-inclusive manner: "All stations, whatever their tr-
pose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause
harmful interference . ,*."' The escape clause in the second paragraph
of Article Fifty-one ("so far as possible") would allow each State to
determine the extent to which it was possible for them to observe any
of the statutory provisions. This permissive clause considered together
with the first paragraph in Article Fifty-one indicates that military in-
stallations are not subject to the I.T.U. Regulations in the same manner
that ordinary telecommunications are controlled. While there has been
some attempt to include military radio installations as a controlled
activity under I.T.U. regulation based on the need to eliminate any
potential interference from military communication satellite systems," 3
and reinforced by an interpretation of the legislative history of the
Telecommunication Convention,' it is doubtful whether there will be
100. I.T.C. (Montreux, 1965) para. 308 (emphasis added).
101. Id., at para. 309. Paragraph 310 of Article Fifty-one requires compliance, in
general, with the regulatory provisions for public correspondence or other services
governed by the Regulations when undertaken by military installations. Again, "in
general" mitigates the effect of the paragraph.
102. Id., at Art. 48, para. 303 (emphasis added).
103. Estep, supra note 95, at 258.
104. Glazer, Some Intorpretive Grapeshot Concerning the Application of the
International Telecommunication Convention to Military Radio Installations, 25 FED. B.J.
308-12 (1965). The author argues that the origin of Article Fifty-one indicated,
through the narrow construction of earlier provisions, a limitation on military radio
installations that did not completely disrupt sovereign prerogative, and that if
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a positive result without further specific I.T.U. legislation. It is
improbable that further legislation will materialize since no nation
would be willing to explain the complete workings of its military com-
munication system to an international body composed of its political
enemies and others who might tend to obstruct a military system if they
could obtain sufficient information about it.
A further problem is that since all satellite launchings to date have
been undertaken by the military branches of the Soviet and American
governments and the astronauts have been in their respective services,
it would be possible to negate the value of the Radio Regulations since
each government could claim the protection of Clause One of Article
Fifty-one of the International Telecommunication Convention which re-
serves "entire freedom" for the operation of the military radio installations
of a country. What would be the implications of a situation where astro-
nauts assumed a dual capacity, and the communications facilities they op-
erated were used both for military and non-military transmissions? Alter-
natively, what if a non-military launching evolved into a military mission
because of its objective rather than because of the official designation of its
personnel?
In addition, an international military satellite system will more than
likely use some of the frequencies presently allocated for terrestrial com-
munication since, (a) the Doppler Effect makes it necessary to use wider
wave bands than would be needed on earth,"" (b) there is decreasing
reception effectiveness caused by the compact antennas used in space
vehicles, and (c) frequencies are greatly restricted since only a limited
number of wave-lengths can pass through the atmosphere and ionosphere
without distortion.' 0 The use of frequencies is also limited by the needs
of the radio astronomers who require specific frequencies for their
research."0 7
the burgeoning complexity of international radio regulation coupled with
the exploitation of new space technologies tend toward a return to some
positive regulatory philosophy for military radio, that event might be resisted
but it could not be decried as some new and untested departure from con-
ventional telecommunication law.
Id., at 314.
105. A. HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 167 (1963).
106. Because of differences in propagation characteristics of waves of various
lengths (frequency being determined by wave length) only certain frequencies can pass
through the strongly ionized layer eighty kilometers above sea level called the ionosphere.
Above 10,000 megacycles certain frequencies have difficulty passing through raindrops
or water vapor.
107. Frequency use is even more limited in radio astronomy since the reception of
emissions from certain elements in space such as deuterium, hydrogen, and hydroxyl
does not allow a frequency choice since reception must be on the specific frequencies of
each element.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
If the I.T.U. is to have any more than a nominal effect on space
telecommunication, it would appear that some method of including, at
least partially, military satellite communications its regulatory
provisions will have to be found. The "military-non-military" dis-
tinction has lost some of its legitimacy since attempts to identify satellites
have emphasized the "peaceful-aggressive" distinction rather than their
military classification. It would be possible, under current I.T.U.
regulations, to claim that aggressive non-military uses came under regula-
tion while peaceful military uses did not. Thus it appears that there is a
definite need for a re-definition of the types of telecommunication ser-
vices that are to come under I.T.U. control, particularly since military
categories have become blurred.
APPLICATION OF CONTROL THEORIES TO UNAUTHORIZED
TELECOMMUNICATION ORIGINATING FROM
ARTIFICIAL SATELLITES
There are several alternative circumstances under which a State
would be concerned with attempting to control the transmissions emanat-
ing from a communications satellite. The scope of its action with regard
to the signal once it entered the airspace above its territory would remain
the same as with any external transmission."0 8 In fact, since outer space
is free for use by all States on a basis of equality in accordance with
international law and is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty or any other means,0 9 it is arguable that a State's action is
limited, with regard to telecommunication transmissions, to control
measures within national airspace. However, absolute liability is
imposed on the launching State of a communication satellite,"0 and
there is a duty to make precautions to avoid injury to other States. Since
the launching State retains sovereign rights over the satellite, it could
be held to a duty not to operate a communication satellite that transmitted
to States not desiring the transmissions. A more complicated situation
would arise if a private organization, not under State control, launched
a communication satellite and used it to transmit to various States.
As long as satellite transmissions must be received by elaborate
ground stations in a country and then re-broadcast to individual receiving
units within the country, the problem of State control through regulation
of the Earth station is simplified. However, by 1975 or even earlier,
direct broadcast satellites will be functioning that will transmit directly
108. National sovereignty over airspace would justify State control measures
whatever the source of the transmission.
109. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 98, at Art. I-III.
110. Id., at Art. VI.
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to individual receivers, and this will pose additional regulatory problems.
The fear has been expressed that the United States., the Soviet Union and
other nations that develop this technical capability will use it to send
political or commercial messages to States without their consent. 1' To
offset this, it is possible that the competence of the International Tele-
communication Union will be expanded to encompass effective control
of all satellite communication, or perhaps a special international agency
will be set up to undertake this task. Another possibility would be the
promulgation of bilateral and multilateral treaties between the affected
nations. The I.T.U. has already suggested the inclusion of a provision
into the Radio Regulations of the I.T.U. that would forbid the establish-
ment and use of broadcasting stations (sound broadcasting and televi-
sion) on board space vehicles, but this may not be sufficient.
If the development of direct satellite broadcasting is seen as an
extension of the problems that were created by commercial private
broadcasting stations, then the need is apparent for comprehensive
legislation. The suggestion has been made that an organization be
established (possibly to be called the Space Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization) as a specialized agency of the United Nations
which would afford each member Nation an equal voice in the planning
and programming of transmissions via a global satellite system. Prop-
aganda and advertising would be barred and disputes would be subject
to arbitration." 2
Another possibility that has been suggested to control a direct broad-
cast system consists of a series of steps to be taken to avoid direct con-
flict over program content and unauthorized transmissions. It is a
proposal to
(1) move ahead with development of technical competence in
the field; (2) encourage international consideration and under-
standing of both the potential benefits and problems of broad-
cast satellites; (3) assist in organization of pilot projects under
international auspices to demonstrate the great potential of
space broadcasting; (4) stimulate international banks and
agencies to support financially facility construction and technical
training in lesser developed countries; (5) reassure friendly
governments that the United States will not use space facilities
to send political or commercial messages into their countries;
(6) take action through the United Nations and UNESCO to
111. 1967 Psoc. Am. Soc'y INT'I L. 34-35.
112. Id., at 36.
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promote cooperative development of space broadcasting; (7)
seek decisions in the ITU for allocation of frequencies for
space broadcasting; and (8) support efforts to use space com-
munication technology to bring the story and explain the
functions of the United Nations to the people of the world.113
It will be noted here, however, that under point (5) the reassurance that
political and commercial messages will not be sent is limited to friendly
governments, and that in all probability these broadcasts will be tran-
smitted to "unfriendly" nations without their consent.
One means by which the receiving State could maximize its control
over an external satellite transmission would be for it to assert that
its airspace extended to the highest possible limit -so that it might include
the orbit of the satellite and therefore the source of the transmission. The
outer space boundary question has been discussed for many years with-
out resolution. John Cobb Cooper suggested that "airspace" as defined
by the Chicago Convention included "only those parts of the atmosphere
above the surface of the earth where gaseous air is sufficiently dense to
provide aerodynamic lift for balloons and airplanes, the only types of
aircraft in existence when the conventions were drafted.""" He then
divided the air above the earth's surface into various zones, the first of
which would extend to the upward limit of airspace and in which States
would exercise full sovereignty. The second zone, known as "con-
tiguous space" would extend from the highest level of territorial space
to the lower limits of outer space. This area would be slowly absorbed
into territorial space as the development of aircraft continued. Outer
space had for its lower boundary the lowest altitude at which an artifi-
cial satellite could be put into orbit. In terms of miles, territorial space
would extend fifty-two miles above Earth's surface, the contiguous
zone would extend up to seventy miles, and outer space would include
everything above these limits. Supporting his theory, Professor Cooper
pointed out that below his space boundary a satellite would be subject to
destruction from atmospheric heat, and above it there would be no
atmospheric interference.
Another justification for placing the boundary at fifty-two miles is
the Karman jurisdictional theory when the boundary "falls at approxi-
mately 275,000 feet (fifty-two miles) where an object travelling at
25,000 feet per second loses its aerodynamic lift and centrifugal force
113. Gardner, Space Broadcasting: Problems of Internatimal Law and Organiza-
tion. Paper presented at the A.I.A.A. Communications Satellite Systems Conference,
May 2-4, 1966, reported in Doyle, supra note 51, at 447.
114. Cooper, Missiles and Satellites: The Law and Our National Policy, 44
A.B.A.J. 319 (1958).
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takes over.""'  This line would change as technicians altered the point of
termination of the efficient performance of an aeronautical vehicle.
It could also be argued that airspace is synonymous with the atmos-
phere and extends to a height of 186 miles, or that it be limited to
twenty-five (the limit of the existence of the atmospheric elements
necessary to lift present day aircraft) or that the atmosphere is limited
and is located below the ionosphere which is approximately seventy miles
above the Earth's surface." 6 There is no ready agreement on the boundary
limit and tabulation of the available literature has produced variations
ranging from thirty miles to infinity.
It appears obvious, however, that airspace and sovereignty extend
at least as high as the altitude presently used for conventional aircraft
as envisioned in the Chicago Convention and customary international
law. This would include such airspace as might be used for air-breathing
aircraft in the future. It is even possible to suggest general acceptance
of the Cooper definition and the Karman jurisdictional line, which would
place the boundary at the probable perigee of satellite orbits. By fixing
the boundary here, the problem of effective control is solved for the
present. The difficulty with any criterion of effective control is that
as technology increases, so will the limit of effective control and hence
the limit of sovereignty.
There is a further problem of determining the extent of a nation's
airspace in that if the vertical boundary lines are drawn from the Earth's
surface using perpendicular measurements, there will be areas of "free"
space that will expand as one approaches infinity. The alternative method
would be to begin the line from the center of the Earth and extend it
beyond the Earth's surface and upwards towards infinity. Further, the
revolution of the Earth on its own axis, its rotation around the sun, and
the movements of the sun and planets through the galaxy, result in the
fact that the relationship of Earth sovereignties to space would not be
constant for even the smallest fraction of time. There would be a series
of cones with constantly changing content. Thus, any determination of
a boundary is entirely arbitrary from a scientific point of view,"' although
a legal determination could justifiably be made for a special purpose such
as telecommunication.
115. Haley, Survey of Legal Opinion on Extraterrestrial Jurisdiction. Paper given
at the 11th Congress, International Astronautical Federation, Aug. 16, 1960, Sweden.
Reprinted in Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Legal Problems of
Space Exploration, S. Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
116. See Jenks, hiternational Law and Activities in Space, 5 INT'L & Coxp. L.Q,
99 (1956).
117. Taubenfeld, A Regime for Outer Space, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1961).
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Alternatively, the wisest choice might be to define the outer space
boundary in terms of specific subjects. For example, there could be one
boundary regarding telecommunication activities and another for other
purposes. The International Telecommunication Union Radio Regula-
tions refer to a space station having to do with telecommunication as one
that has the capability of going beyond the major portion of the Earth's
atmosphere. Specifically, the broadcasting satellite service is considered
to be a space service where the signals are transmitted or re-transmitted
by reflection from objects in orbit around the Earth and are intended
for direct reception by the general public.118 It would appear that a
boundary that was set at the point of perigee of the communications
satellite "for purposes of telecommunication only" would be generally
satisfactory. The fact that there are definitions available in the I.T.U.
Radio Regulations would make recourse to the arbitration provisions in
the I.T.U. Convention possible. The idea of making the boundary depend
on the activity performed rather than simply an arbitrary determination
of height might lead to a more reasoned solution of the problem.
Thus, it is apparent that the use of artificial satellites for interna-
tional telecommunication purposes has created a number of problem
areas on an international level that require intensive examination. To
provide the optimum measure of effective control over satellite telecommun-
ication it will be necessary to consider the re-organization of INTELSAT
and the expansion of the competence of the I.T.U. in the light of the
policies thought to be desirable and the realities of the international
political situation. It is suggested that the first preference for the organi-
zation of a global commercial communication satellite system should entail
the continuation of the basic INTELSAT structure, taking into account
the need for substantive revisions concerning voting procedures and
veto provisions but with a continued recognition of the validity of in-
vestment quotas as a measure of decision-making capacity. The con-
tinued viability of the INTELSAT structure would be aided by a formal
recognition of the role of the I.T.U. in technical and administrative
regulation with particular emphasis on the development of a managerial
capacity regarding space service frequency allocation and orbit location.
In addition the I.T.U. should develop the necessary rules for the accom-
modation of military communications satellite systems and the effective
control of unauthorized telecommunication originating from outer space.
In each of the above areas, this article has suggested the possibilities
for increased co-operation and the functional resolution of specific
118. I.T.U. Radio Regs., para. 84AP.
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problems which could greatly facilitate not only the formulation of
regulatory procedures but also the development of relevant international
law concepts. Without such concepts, competing State interests will most
likely create a situation where public order is secondary to political ad-
vantage, and stability is considered only of marginal importance.
